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Political Leaders in Westminster Systems 
There is little doubt that political leaders have become more politically 
important over the past half century, although the extent which their electoral 
influence may have increased remains a matter of debate.  This fundamental 
change in the role of political leaders has been especially pronounced in 
parliamentary systems based on the Westminster model.  In parliamentary 
systems, the promotion of leader images during national election campaigns is 
now as prominent—perhaps even more prominent—than party symbols, 
leading some to argue that the Westminster system is converging with its 
presidential counterpart (Mughan, 2000).  In parallel with this change, 
governments and sometimes even oppositions are routinely labeled after the 
leader by the media and by the public, rather than after the party they lead 
(McAllister, 1996). 
The defining moment in this change is often traced to Margaret Thatcher’s 
accession to office in Britain as the first ‘conviction politician’ of the postwar 
years.  However, it is often forgotten that Pierre Trudeau’s election as Canadian 
prime minister in 1968 led to the ‘Trudeaumania’ phenomenon which is 
perhaps the earliest manifestation of a prime minister’s popularity surpassing 
that of his or her party.  Since the 1990s, it has become more commonplace for 
governments or parties to be named after their leader.  In Germany, the 
popularity of Helmut Kohl and more recently Gerhard Schroder has at various 
times easily eclipsed the parties they lead, as has the popularity of Silvio 
Berlusconi in Italy and Tony Blair in Britain. 
The changing role of prime ministers has not only occurred in terms of their 
public profile within the electorate.  In the context of their capacity to influence 
policy, postwar prime ministers in Westminster systems have accumulated 
considerably greater power and authority when compared to their prewar 
counterparts (King, 1994; Rhodes, 1995).  In many Westminster systems, it is 
often argued that cabinet government based on collective responsibility has 
been undermined, in part by the increased complexity of modern decision-
making, but also by a conscious effort to centralize prime ministerial authority.  
Moreover, in majoritarian systems such as that of Australia and Britain, the 
prime minister now exercises unprecedented power in shaping ministerial 
careers, a crucial tool in ensuring compliance and centralizing authority.   
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The prima facie evidence suggests, then, that prime ministers and opposition 
leaders have replaced many of the roles historically played by political parties 
in ensuring the efficient operation of the parliamentary system.  This chapter 
examines the evidence to support this observation in Australia, Britain and 
Canada, focusing especially on the presidentialization hypothesis.  However, a 
major task of the chapter is also to outline some of the factors which have led to 
a greater focus on prime ministers, and in this, these are divided between 
exogenous factors, such as the changing role of television, and institutional 
changes, such as the increasing complexity of public policy. 
Australia, Britain and Canada are particularly appropriate case studies.  
Although all three operate political systems which have a common origin in the 
Westminster model, they vary considerably in how that model has evolved to 
cope with their differing circumstances.  Both Australia and Canada adopted 
federal systems, although there the similarity ends.  In Australia, the power of 
the majority party is tempered by the influence of the upper house, the Senate.  
Originally conceived of as the ‘state’s house’—a house of review in which the 
states’ aims would balance those of the parties—in recent years the control of 
the Senate by the opposition parties has effectively meant that the government 
must either drop or radically alter its more controversial legislation if it wishes 
to see it implemented (Sharman, 1999).1 
In neither Britain nor Canada is their such an institutional impediment to 
majority rule.  In Britain the governing party can count on implementing its 
legislative program.  The House of Lords represents no major impediment to  
the government putting its policies into law, and in the rare occasions when its 
lower house majority has been so small as to place its legislative program in 
jeopardy, an election has been called.2  In Canada the federal government is 
effectively independent of the provinces in the areas in which it has 
jurisdiction; when negotiation takes place, it is generally in the areas of 
provincial jurisdiction when the provinces are seeking federal financial 
support.  In both Australia and Canada, then, prime ministerial authority must 
take account of federalism in realizing their policy goals, and in the former, this 
means the constraint placed on such authority by the upper house. 
1 Parliamentary Systems and Political Leaders 
Institutional arrangements influence many aspects of the operation and 
functioning of political systems, but what has been less well-recognized is the 
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influence that institutional arrangements have on the style and content of 
political leadership.  Some institutional structures are clearly more conducive to 
the leaders gaining greater prominence than others.  The major distinction in 
executive leadership is, of course, between their presidential and parliamentary 
forms, or what Lijphart (1994) characterizes as majoritarian versus consensus 
democracy.  Both systems have specific consequences for the ways in which 
their respective political leaders operate, and for their profile and image with 
the electorate.  There are also major variations between parliamentary systems 
which impact on political leaders, five of which are discussed below. 
No conflict between the legislature and the executive.  Perhaps the most 
distinctive difference between parliamentary and presidential systems is while 
the executive is elected by and responsible to the electorate in a presidential 
system, in a parliamentary system the executive is formed from, and depends 
for its continuing survival upon, the legislature.3  In parliamentary systems, by 
contrast, the executive depends for its survival on the confidence of the 
legislature.  Indeed, in most cases the prime minister is selected by the 
legislature, although in practice this will normally be the leader of the majority 
party or, in coalition governments, the leader of the party with the most seats.  
The executive can therefore be removed at any time by the legislature, usually 
after a vote of no confidence. 
In practice, this means that a prime minister must make it a priority to retain 
the confidence of his or her party colleagues and to refine carefully his or her 
performance in office, since the date when the government will be judged by 
the electorate at the polls is less certain.  The prime minister, therefore, is under 
constant threat of having her position undermined, with particular 
consequences for the way in which she exercises authority.  The prime minister 
has to exercise strong leadership over the parliamentary party, to ensure 
discipline and loyalty.  One way to maintain discipline is through the party 
whips, who secure the attendance of members for votes; another is by 
performing well during prime minister’s question time (or question period in 
Canada). 
Majoritarian.  A second characteristic of parliamentary systems, notably those 
based on the Westminster model, is that they usually have majoritarian 
arrangements (Lijphart, 1994), although a significant number of European 
democracies maintain coalition forms of government (Laver and Schofield, 
1990).  Majoritarian arrangements lead most directly to providing the prime 
4 
minister with an appropriate public forum from which to gain prominence, 
while the high turnover in coalition-based systems inevitably reduces the 
power of the leader and their public profile.  The extreme case of the latter is 
Italy, where the institutional structures are explicitly designed to reduce the 
power of the leader through high rates of government turnover.  Moreover, in 
coalition governments, the leader may have difficulty in securing the loyalty of 
a diverse range of parties, as has been the case in Israel (Hazan, 1997).  
Responsible government.  The notion of responsible government lies at the 
heart of the Westminster model of government.  Collectively, responsible 
government means that ministers must take responsibility for the performance 
of the government; individually, ministers must answer for the conduct of the 
departments they represent in parliament.  While responsible government also 
operates in the presidential model, this takes place through individual 
responsibility, so that one person forms the executive for a fixed period of time; 
even members of the president's own party may vote against whatever 
measures he or she proposes, without undermining the day-to-day operation of 
the system or risking a split within the incumbent party (Lijphart, 1994).   
The notion of responsible government has undergone considerable change in 
the Westminster democracies during the course of the past century.  Collective 
cabinet responsibility has often been weakened and dissent tolerated on specific 
issues, such as entry into the European Union in Britain, or separatism in 
Canada.  Individual responsibility has now been expanded in most 
Westminster systems to include senior public servants as well as ministers, as 
public policy has become more complex and direct responsibility for policies 
more diffuse (Woodhouse, 1994). 
The patterns of ministerial resignations since 1945 in Australia, Britain and 
Canada shed some light on the operation of responsible government.  The 
results in Figure 1 suggest that, if anything, ministers are becoming more prone 
to resign, although many of these resignations involve some form of personal 
impropriety, rather than ministerial incompetence or maladministration.  What 
the patterns do show is the predominant influence of the prime minister in the 
operation of responsible government.  In Britain, for example, both Harold 
Wilson during his first ministry (between 1964 and 1970) and John Major 
(between 1990 and 1997) were less minded to tolerate impropriety than other 
prime ministers, and therefore did not protect their ministers if they became the 
subject of allegations.  Similarly, the large number of resignations during the 
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Whitlam ministry (1972 to 1975) in Australia reflects the character of the prime 
minister and his relationship with his ministers.  And in Canada, the large 
number of resignations during the Mulroney ministry was a consequence of the 
government’s aggregative privatization policies and the often disorderly way in 
which they were pursued. 
The role of the prime minister is therefore central in how responsible 
government operates; he or she may choose to include or exclude particular 
actions under the doctrine, thereby determining the minister’s fate.  The fact 
that there is general agreement about the weakening of the doctrine in recent 
years, tends to support the argument that prime ministerial power has 
increased, and that it is the prime minister, rather than the parliament, which 
determines how the doctrine is implemented (Kam, 2000).  The second factor is 
the role of the mass media; as Figure 1 shows, ministerial resignations have 
increased considerably since 1945, despite the apparent weakening of the 
doctrine; this ‘is certainly a function of closer press scrutiny of government 
ministers as people, if not a closer scrutiny of their policies’ (Dowding and 
Kang, 1998: 425).4  
Figure 1: Ministerial Resignations Since 1945 
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Note Only resignations which involved some form of impropriety or political 
conflict are included. 
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Sources Dowding and Kang (1998); McAllister. Mackerras and Bolderston (1997); 
Sutherland (1991). 
Party discipline.  Studies of party cohesion generally assume that political 
parties in parliamentary democracies are more cohesive and programmatic 
than their counterparts in presidential systems (Diermeier and Feddersen, 
1998).  Cohesion is frequently measured by parliamentary dissent, in the form 
of crossing the floor or roll-call voting.  In Britain, for example, crossing the 
floor of the House of Commons is relatively common (Norton, 2000).  By 
contrast, in Australia parliamentary dissent is almost unknown, and in the rare 
occasions on which it occurs results in a defection to another party, or de-
selection at the next election.  Australian backbench parliamentarians display 
their opposition to the party’s program in the party room, though invariably 
these occasions are widely reported in the media. 
Party cohesion and discipline is central to the programmatic function of 
parliamentary parties—the implementation of a legislative program which 
forms the basis of voters’ evaluations of the government performance, and their 
prospects for re-election.  Cox and McCubbins (1993) argue that legislators 
establish structures and procedures to ensure that this occurs with the 
minimum of dissent or difficulty.  Prime ministers allocate rewards and 
punishments in order to ensure the passage of the legislative program.  The 
increasing range and complexity of a government’s legislative program places 
even greater importance on the ability of the prime minister to deal with 
dissent.  Much of this has been shown to be a consequence of the leader: strong 
leaders, such as Margaret Thatcher, have witnessed less dissent within their 
own party despite their strong majorities, compared to leaders such as Edward 
Heath, who experienced considerable dissent.  Another factor ensuring 
compliance is the increasing party-related backgrounds of legislators, making 
them more dependent on the prime minister for career advancement (Riddell, 
1993). 
Maximum terms for the government and the legislature.  In contrast to 
presidential systems, parliamentary systems have maximum periods between 
elections, with the timing of the election usually residing at the discretion of the 
prime minister.  In most cases, the prime minister may call an election if the 
government loses a vote of confidence in the legislature, or if the parliamentary 
term is coming to an end and the prime minister considers the time propitious 
to dissolve parliament.  The result is that the governing party must exercise a 
strong degree of discipline over their members in order to ensure that they 
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retain office (and conversely, the opposition party must do the same, in order to 
be seen as a credible alternative).  The prime minister, therefore, has a major 
influence in being able to determine the date of the election, and the 
prerogative of dissolution is often viewed as a major threat that can be used 
against dissident members. 
Various observers have interpreted the power to recommend a dissolution as 
a major means of ensuring discipline within the prime minister’s own party 
(Huber, 1996).  Although this power is often regarded as a bluff—a divided 
government would have more to lose as a result of an election than the 
opposition—it is also the case that in Australia, Britain and Canada no postwar 
government has lost a no confidence motion due to dissent by its own 
members.  The power of dissolution is therefore an important threat which can 
be used to quell dissent among members of the governing party, who may be 
seeking to change the government’s legislative program.  Nevertheless, dissent 
can only be taken so far, since at the end of the day, the dissenters are 
dependent on the party for re-election and for career advancement (Carey and 
Shugart, 1995). 
The length of the parliamentary term, of course, has implications for the 
power of the prime minister.  A study by the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 1993 
found that all but 17 of 148 democracies have four or five years as their 
maximum lower house term (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1993).  Only 13 
countries have a three year term, prominent among them Australia, New 
Zealand and Sweden, and only one country—the US—has a two year term.  At 
the other end of the scale, only three countries have a six year term.  It might be 
expected that shorter terms would enhance the role of the prime minister in a 
parliamentary system, by making the prospect of an election ever closer, and 
the need for unity and discipline ever greater. 
Notwithstanding partisan dealignment and increased electoral volatility, 
which might lead to shorter terms since the governing party would be less 
likely to hold a secure majority, it would appear that the parliamentary terms in 
Australia, Canada and Britain have actually increased over the past half 
century (Table 1).  In Australia, the average parliamentary term has increased 
by just under two days at each successive election, in Canada by four days, and 
in Britain by just over six days.  In the case of Australia, for example, a 
parliamentary term in the 1990s could be expected to be over a month longer 
than a term at the end of the 1940s, in the context of a three year maximum 
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term.  In Britain, the difference is even greater in relative and absolute terms—
just over three months, over a five year maximum term. 
Table 1: Changes in Parliamentary Terms Since 1945 
 Inter-election 
change (weeks) 
 
Period 
 
(N timepoints) 
Australia 0.245 1945-2001 (22) 
Britain 0.879 1945-2001 (15) 
Canada 0.578 1945-2000 (17) 
 
Note The per annum change is the change based on an ordinary least squares 
regression line. 
Explanations for this finding must remain speculative, but the comparable 
trends in each of the three countries suggests some commonality.  One possible 
explanation is the enhanced role of the prime minister, and his or her increased 
power to determine the date of election.  Since it is obviously in the interests of 
the prime minister to delay an election until the last possible moment—
maximizing the period in office and the opportunities to implement the 
government’s legislative agenda, the prime minister will obviously to increase 
the term wherever possible.  The data in Table 1 are suggestive of this having 
taken place over the last half century. 
2 The Presidentialization of Westminster Systems? 
The relentless pace of global change has led to the hypothesis that 
parliamentary systems are becoming more presidential in character, style and 
operation, as the environments within which they operate become more 
uniform.  In parliamentary systems, the development of the mass media, the 
increasing complexity of government and party policies, weakening social and 
partisan loyalties and declining turnout, have all contributed to focus more 
popular attention on the role of the prime minister, and to a lesser extent, the 
opposition leader.  In this view, what is occurring is a presidentialization of the 
role of the prime minister in the Westminster democracies.  While it is a trend 
that could apply to all Westminster systems, it is seen as having progressed 
farthest in Britain, becoming established under Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s 
and being reinforced by Tony Blair since 1997 (Mughan, 2000). 
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Descriptions of this apparent shift in the nature and function of 
parliamentary systems has attracted a wide variety of terms.  Most frequently 
used is the ‘presidentialization’ or ‘electoral presidentialization’ of 
parliamentary systems (Mughan, 2000: 130), but other terms, such as ‘semi-
presidentialism’, ‘semi-parliamentarism’, ‘presidential parliamentarism’ and 
‘prime ministerialism’ have appeared (for a review, see Elgie, 1997).  Whatever 
the description that is applied, all share the common theme that parliamentary 
government—with political power being exercised through collective cabinet 
responsibility—has now given way to political power which is wielded by a 
single political figure—a president operating within a nominally parliamentary 
system. 
Beyond largely impressionistic evidence to support the presidentialization 
view—the naming of governments or parties after the leaders, as noted 
earlier—rigorous tests of the hypothesis using electoral data are rare.  
Suggestive evidence in support of the hypothesis comes from a study by 
Lanoue and Headrick (1994) which used aggregate data from 1953 until 1987 to 
examine the relative importance of prime ministerial popularity, economic 
evaluations and specific events on the government’s lead in the polls.  The 
authors concluded that there was an incremental increase in the importance of 
the prime minister, which began in the 1960s, well before the advent of the 
Thatcher era.  This they regarded as important, since Thatcher’s steep rise in 
personal popularity after winning the Falklands War in 1982 tended to obscure 
longer term trends.  Lanoue and Headrick conclude that ‘the 1960s ushered in a 
new perspective on parties and prime ministers, one in which public opinion 
towards the governing party and its leader were more closely tied to one 
another.’ (p.202). 
The major study of presidentialization in Britain has been conducted by 
Tony Mughan (2000).  In surveying the role of prime ministers in Britain since 
the 1960s, he draws an important distinction between presentation and impact.  
Mughan argues that there is little doubt that in their public persona, prime 
ministers are now more prominent than ever before, but that the case for the 
prime minister having more impact on the vote is less easy to evaluate.  After 
analyzing a range of British Election Studies, Mughan concludes on this point 
that ‘prime ministerial candidates are generally a more substantial influence on 
the vote than campaign issues … having the right leader can mean the 
difference between victory and defeat for a party in closely fought contests’ 
(p.129).  
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One of the major difficulties in evaluating the presidentialization argument 
is to distinguish between the effects attributable to the incumbent, and those 
that are associated with the office.  Since a relatively small number of cases are 
available for analysis, this is a major concern.  Margaret Thatcher, for example, 
had a central presence in the British political system during the 1980s, easily 
eclipsing that of her successor, John Major, during the early 1990s.  Equally, 
Tony Blair has had a major impact on British politics.  The presidentialization 
hypothesis assumes that the influence of the leader will increase incrementally 
with the passage of time, other things being equal, since the prime minister’s 
popularity and influence is being shaped by a wide range of exogenous factors, 
such as the mass media and administrative change, which give rise to 
institutional convergence.   
By contrast, the incumbency hypothesis suggests that prime ministerial 
popularity and influence will vary with the characteristics of the leader in 
question, and may go up or down, depending on his or her popular image.  In 
an analysis of prime ministerial approval between 1979 and 1996, Clarke, Ho 
and Stewart (2000) find support for the incumbency hypothesis, with the 
impact of prime ministerial approval declining significantly with the 
replacement of Thatcher by Major.  However, Thatcher’s popularity may have 
been affected by the legacy of British success in the Falklands War.  There is no 
doubt that prior to the Argentine invasion, the Thatcher government was 
immensely unpopular, and following the war the government’s increased 
popularity carried it to a decisive win in the 1983 general election.  However, 
while Mishler et al (1989), Norpoth (1987) and Clarke et al (1990) argue that her 
increased popularity occurred as a consequence of the Falklands War, Sanders 
et al (1987) argue that economic reforms were at the heart of the change. 
Events such as the Falklands War, along with terrorist incidents, are 
idiosyncratic; there are few partisan advantages to be derived from them, other 
than the advantage conveyed by incumbency.  A substantial US literature has 
emerged to examine the electoral consequences of international crises, 
suggesting that such events focus attention on the elected leader, enhancing 
their status and authority in the eyes of the public (Ostrom and Simon, 1985).  
Nichelsburg and Norpoth (2000) conclude that foreign policy, at least during 
the Ford through to the Clinton administrations, was as important in 
determining presidential popularity as economic policy: ‘the chief executive 
must be commander-in-chief and chief economist in nearly equal measure’ 
(p.329).  It would be reasonable to surmise, by implication, by the effect of 
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international crises would affect the role of the prime minister in a 
parliamentary system in much the same way. 
The evidence to support the presidentialization hypothesis is therefore 
mixed.  The central difficulty is distinguishing between idiosyncratic events 
and personalities from broadly-based, long term institutional trends which may 
also play their part in shaping the nature of executive power and bringing 
about convergence.  Moreover, when several of these factors compound one 
another—as was the case, for example, in the combination of the Falklands War 
and the personality of Margaret Thatcher—it is difficult to gauge what is a 
discernible shift in executive power due to the specific circumstances of the 
time, and what is due to long-term patterns of change.  Following Elgie (1997), 
the following two sections distinguish between these range of factors in terms 
of their exogenous influence on leadership, and institutional influences. 
3 Exogenous Influences on Leadership 
The potential range of external influences on executive power—those which 
fall outside the day-to-day operation of political institutions—is, of course, vast.  
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify four major external factors which help to 
shape the context within which power is exercised and have the potential to 
alter significantly the nature of prime ministerial authority.  The most obvious 
is the role of television and its associated effects on how electoral campaigns are 
conducted and major political events presented to the electorate.  Long term 
changes within the mass public are also important, and two factors are 
identified here—partisan dealignment and the decline in electoral participation.  
Finally, the internal dynamics of parties, and more particularly the decline in 
party organization, has indirect consequences for the context within which 
executive power is exercised. 
The Role of Television.  Many of the changes that have been observed in the 
role of the prime minister in Westminster systems have been traced back to the 
growth of the electronic media, and especially television, in the 1950s and 
1960s.  In the early years of television’s development, the new media gave scant 
attention to politics, but as their coverage of politics—and especially political 
leaders—increased, so too did the way in which voters viewed their leaders.  In 
Britain, for example, party political broadcasting on television was introduced 
in the 1950s, but it was not until the 1964 general election that it came into its 
own, when the two major parties were allocated 75 minutes each of free 
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television broadcasting (McAllister, 1985).  Perhaps coincidentally, this general 
election was the first in Britain where the term ‘presidential’ was used to 
describe the character of the campaign (Mughan, 2000: 27). 
During the period for which election data are available in the three 
Westminster systems, the proportion of the population with access to television 
sets increased substantially, most notably in Canada, where the proportion 
almost doubled between the early 1970s and the late 1990s (Figure 2).  The 
trend for Australia and Britain shows less steady growth; nevertheless, in 
Britain, almost twice as many people had access to a television set in 2001 than 
was the case in 1964.5   
Figure 2: Television Penetration 
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Starting in the 1960s, television rapidly became an indispensable tool for 
modern election campaigning (Bowler and Farrell, 1992; Norris et al, 1999).  
Indicative of this change has been the increasing importance of televized 
debates between the leaders during election campaigns, starting in the United 
States with the debate between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon in the 1960 
presidential election campaign.  Since then, the idea of a leaders’ debate has 
spread across the established democracies.  Of 45 democracies which were 
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examined in the mid-1990s, all but four had a leaders’ debate at the immediate 
past election (LeDuc et al, 1996: 45-48).  This represents a substantial increase 
on the previous survey, which found that in the late 1970s, a leaders’ debate 
took place in just seven of 21 parliamentary systems (Smith, 1981). 
Australia and Canada have an established history of mounting leaders’ 
debates, while the parties in Britain have generally resisted calls to have a 
formal leaders’ debate.6  In Australia, the first televised debate was held in 1984, 
but not in the subsequent 1987 election; since 1990, the debate has become an 
established and formal part of the election campaign, the only point of 
disagreement between the parties being whether to have one or two debates, 
with the incumbent wishing the minimize the risks of a live television debate, 
the challenger wishing to maximize it.  In Canada, televised leaders’ debates 
have also become an integral part of the election campaign, starting with the 
first debate in 1968; by convention, one debate is usually held in English, and 
one in French (Le Duc, 1990, 1994). 
The proportion of voters watching the televised leaders’ debates in both 
Australia and Canada has been declining.  In Australia the highpoint occurred 
in 1993, when seven out of 10 voters said that they had watched at least one of 
the two debates held during the election.  This declined to 58 percent in 1996, 
and in 2001, just four out of every 10 voters said that watched the debate 
between John Howard and Kim Beazley (Figure 3).  There is a similar pattern in 
Canada: the highpoint was the 1984 election, when no less than 89 percent 
watched the debate between John Turner and Brian Mulroney, but the 
proportion watching each debate has declined since, to 44 percent in 1997, and 
45 percent in 2000. 
Figure 3: Voters Watching the Leaders’ Debates 
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Note The Australian figures for 1990 and 1993 are the proportion of voters who 
watched at least one of the two debates; the remaining elections had just one 
debate.  The Canadian figures are for watching the English debate. 
Sources Australian Election Studies, 1990-2001, Canadian Election Studies, 1968-2000. 
The media’s intense focus on leaders in its political reporting has several 
explanations.  The most obvious is the nature of the electronic media, especially 
television, and the way in which information is presented to media consumers.  
In general, the media find it easier to disseminate visual and oral information 
through a familiar personality rather than through a document or an institution 
(Glaser and Salmon, 1991; see also Ranney, 1983).  As individuals themselves, 
viewers are more likely to develop a rapport with the individuals they see in 
the mass media, and to empathize with them and the goals they espouse.  
Viewers may place themselves in the role of the individuals they see, or in the 
role of the interviewers, and as a consequence gain a better understanding of 
the leader’s views.  For the mass media, too, party leaders are a convenient 
visual shortcut to capture and retain the viewer’s attention. 
Political parties also find it advantageous to highlight their political leaders 
and to ensure that they remain centrestage.  Parties find it easier to market 
political choices to voters through an individual, who can promote a particular 
policy much more effectively when compared to the simple dissemination of a 
press release or the publication of a policy document.  Such a policy can be 
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promoted by the leader who can also be questioned or debated with by an 
interviewer, vicariously representing voters, further heightening popular 
interest.  Particularly where the party is in government, the promotion of the 
leader’s personality characteristics can enhance the advantages that accrue to 
incumbency, further benefiting the party’s electoral standing among voters. 
The ability of voters to hold governments accountable for their actions 
provides a further explanation for their emphasis on leaders.  Voters prefer to 
hold an individual accountable for government performance (or, occasionally, 
for the performance of the opposition), rather than an abstract institution or a 
political ideal (Bean and Mughan, 1989).  This is more important in a 
parliamentary system, where collective cabinet responsibility and the fortunes 
of the government as a whole may blurr accountability in the eyes of the public.  
By focusing attention on the prime minister as the individual who is 
accountable for the government’s collective performance, the public find it 
easier to deliver reward or punishment, when compared to an abstract 
collectivity. 
Partisan Dealignment.  A second general change in the political context within 
which leaders operate, and one which has direct consequences for them, is the 
widespread partisan dealignment that has occurred across all of the advanced 
democracies in the past several decades (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Webb, 
Farrell and Holliday, 2002).  The extent of partisan dealignment in Australia, 
Britain and Canada is illustrated in Figures 4 and 5.  The proportion of 
respondents eschewing a party identity in all three countries has increased 
significantly, most dramatically in Canada, where one in four voters fell into 
this category in the 1997 election (Figure 4).7  In Australia and Britain, the 
growth is more modest, although in both countries the proportion of non-
partisans has more than doubled during the period for which data are 
available.  The decline in the proportion of voters describing themselves as 
‘very strong’ partisans (Figure 5) has been very similar across the three 
countries, at between 10 and 16 percent of the electorate. 
Figure 4: Non-Partisanship in Australia, Britain and Canada 
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Source: Combined Leaders’ stacked dataset. 
A major consequence of partisan dealignment is heightened electoral 
volatility.  With weaker loyalties to the major political parties, and in the 
absence of strong bonds anchoring them to specific parties, voters are 'set 
politically adrift and subject to volatile election swings' (Wattenberg, 1991: 2).  
Weaker voter attachments enhance the role of the leader in both the 
mobilization and conversion of the vote.8  In the absence of party cues, voters 
may rely more heavily on the appeal of the leader’s personality in order to 
shape their vote.   For example, during the 2001 British general election, with an 
historically low turnout in prospect, the Labour leader, Tony Blair, was used 
extensively to both encourage voters to participate in the election, as well as to 
cast their vote for Labour. 
Figure 5: ‘Very Strong’ Partisans in Australia, Britain and Canada 
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Source: Combined Leaders’ stacked dataset. 
Declining Electoral Participation.  In line with changes in electoral participation 
in most of the advanced democracies, turnout has been declining in Britain and 
Canada (in Australia, the system of compulsory voting means that traditional 
measures of turnout have little relevance and since 1955, turnout has varied 
little from a mean of 95 percent of the electorate).  In both countries, the decline 
in turnout has been especially precipitous in the last decade, following a 
prolonged period of gradual decline.  The turnout of 59.4 percent in the 2000 
British general election, for example, was the lowest since the ‘khaki’ election of 
1918, itself an election marked by postwar adjustment, women’s 
enfranchisement and an almost threefold increase in the size of the electorate.  
In Canada, the turnout of 61.2 percent in the 2000 election was by far the lowest 
of any postwar federal election, lower even than the 69.3 percent turnout 
recorded in the 1980 election. 
The assumption is that declining turnout will enhance the role of the prime 
minister, by focusing greater attention on the leader’s role in mobilizing the 
vote, above and beyond party considerations.  In addition, in voluntary voting 
systems such as Britain and Canada’s, we might expect that the decline in 
electoral participation would result in fewer voters turning out to the polls, but 
ones who would be more motivated by economic self-interest in reaching their 
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voting decision.  This conclusion is in line with findings which show that the 
greater propensity of late deciding voters in Australian, British and US elections 
are more likely to be rational and calculating, rather than capricious or 
disinterested.  In such a context, the role of the leader in framing and 
promoting policies to attract these voters may well become more important 
over the course of time (McAllister, 2002). 
Figure 6: Turnout in Britain and Canada Since 1945 
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Source: International IDEA. 
The Decline of Party Organizations.  In line with many other social and 
technological changes in the advanced democracies, the traditional concept of 
the mass party has been in decline for more than half a century, most notably in 
the Westminster systems where they first originated (Scarrow, 2000).  The 
decline of parties as mass organizations and the increasing difficulty that 
parties encounter in mobilizing the vote has shifted voters' attentions away 
from local election campaigns and towards the national political stage.  In 
parallel with this change, the major parties have often shifted their emphasis 
from local to national political leaders, in turn elevating to high office those 
who they believe will exercise the maximum geographical and social appeal to 
voters.  As a result, leaders are selected as much for their popular appeal as for 
their policy skills or political acumen. 
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This change means that is there is now less emphasis on a party's policies 
than in the past, and more emphasis on the personalities of the leaders who will 
have to implement those policies if they win election.  In turn, there is research 
to indicate that voters evaluate the personal images of the leaders in terms of 
their capacity to implement policy (Wattenberg, 1991: 13-30).  In practice, the 
information that a voter accumulates about a leader is an essential tool that 
enables the voter to reach a judgement about the capacity of the various 
candidates to achieve their policy goals.  While most of the research which has 
analyzed candidate images and their underpinnings comes from the United 
States, there is no reason to suppose that the findings do not also apply to 
parliamentary systems as well. 
While declining organizational capacity may enhance the role of the leader, 
by enabling him or her to appeal to the broad mass of voters over the heads of 
their party, there are also dangers.  Declining branch memberships can facilitate 
the takeover of the party by ideologically driven activists.  This occurred most 
dramatically in Britain in the 1980s, when leftwing activists dominated many 
Labour branches, selecting leftwing election candidates and imposing 
electorally disastrous polices, most notably unilateral nuclear disarmament.  
Leftwing entrism within the Labour Party was one of the causes of the Labour 
split in 1982 and the formation of the Social Democrat Party (Crewe and King, 
1997).  A similar process occurred in Australia in the 1980s and 1990s, where 
‘branch-stacking’ by ethnic groups caused a succession of difficulties for Labor 
in its policies towards Australia’s diverse ethnic electorates. 
4 Institutional Explanations 
Institutions shape the operation of prime ministerial authority in various 
ways—through the rules of electoral competition, or parliamentary procedure, 
for example.  As with the endogenous explanations for executive power, the 
range of potential candidates for inclusion in this list is vast.  The two main 
factors focused on here are those which recur most frequently in the literature, 
and which are closest to the types of executive power exercised by the prime 
minister—the increasing complexity of decision-making, and the role of the 
public service in that process. 
The Complexity of Decisionmaking.  Public administration studies have 
identified some of the factors internal to government which may enhance the 
role and authority of the prime minister.  In a comparative study of the Western 
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democracies, King (1995) identified the major factors as the ability to control the 
careers of other ministers, which is greater in a single governing party with a 
parliamentary majority than in a coalition, and the public visibility of the 
leader.  On the latter, King argued that if the prime minister’s visibility was 
high, then he or she would have a greater propensity to influence policy: ‘if the 
prime minister is going to be held responsible for what happens, he is likely to 
want to be responsible’ (p.158).9   
In a study focused on Britain, Rhodes (1995) distinguishes between six types 
of prime ministerial influence within the cabinet, ranging from the lowest, 
where power is characterized by bureaucratic co-ordination, to the highest, 
which he terms monocratic government.  The highest level, which equates most 
closely with presidentialization, is distinguished by ‘a general ability to decide 
policy across all issue areas in which he or she takes an interest; by deciding 
key issues which subsequently determine most remaining areas of government 
policy; or by defining a governing ethos or “atmosphere” which generates 
predictable and hard solutions to most policy problems’ (p.15). 
While it is obvious that the increasing complexity in the range and type of 
decisions that government must take enhances the power of the prime minister, 
the institutional context for decision-making also varies as a consequence of 
leadership style (Elgie, 1997).  A distinction is often made between leadership 
that relies on the charismatic appeal of the prime minister over collegial 
discussion, as opposed to collective decision-making which emphasizes 
consensus decisions (Kavanagh, 1990).  Evaluating how leadership styles 
influence the role of the prime minister over an extended period, net of other 
factors, is of course difficult.  However, if there is a general awareness that 
decision-making is becoming more complex, then we might expect that 
parliamentary parties (which normally select prime ministers) will want to 
choose leaders who rely more on charisma than on collegial consensus. 
The Role of the Public Service.  In all three countries under examination, prime 
ministerial authority has been enhanced by a compliant and (at least in the case 
of Australia) a more politicized public service.  The Westminster tradition of a 
career public service in which advice to ministers is ‘fearlessly and impartially 
given’ has been replaced by a senior cadre of political appointees.  This process 
has gone furthest in Australia, where it is often argued that the policy agenda of 
the Liberal-National conservative government elected in 1996 has been assisted 
by a compliant public service.  One view of this compliance, put forward by 
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Pusey (1991), is that a small group of senior bureaucrats with economic 
rationalist views were prepared to implement the government’s agenda against 
the wishes of the mainstream public service, who possessed more traditional 
economic views.  A contrary view was that generational change within the 
political and bureaucratic elite resulted in the creation of a shared set of policy 
goals, which enabled the public service to promote the government’s agenda 
(Dunn 1997). 
While there are debates about the level of politicization of the public service, 
it is clear that the way in which the public service operates, the types of 
decisions its members must reach, and the advice that they provide to 
ministers, have changed profoundly over the past two decades.  Bureaucrats 
now have an important strategic role in decision-making, and one which 
increasingly blurs the distinction between party-appointed ministerial advisors 
and career public servants.  In addition, the proliferation of think tanks, often 
with strong partisan attachments, provides a further source of strategic policy 
advice (Stone, 1996).  The ability of the prime minister to derive strategic advice 
from these sources should, in principle, result in a greater concentration of 
executive authority. 
5 Rating the Leaders 
To what extent has there been a change in voters’ ratings of prime ministers 
in the three countries, during the period for which survey data is available?  If 
the presidential hypothesis were to be confirmed, we would expect a gradual 
increase in leader ratings, as leaders gain greater prominence and find 
correspondingly greater support within the electorate.  The evidence provides 
little support for the presidentialization hypothesis, at least in so far as voters’ 
ratings of the leaders are concerned (Figure 7).  In Britain, where the longest 
period of data is available, the overall trend between 1964 and 2001 shows two 
significant peaks, in 1983 for Margaret Thatcher following the Falklands War, 
and for John Major in 1993, just after he became prime minister.  There are also 
several low points since 1964, notably for Edward Heath in the two 1974 
elections, and for John Major in the 1997 election, which he lost to Tony Blair.  
Overall, there is no discernible trend over the extended period of the surveys. 
Figure 7: Voters’ Ratings of Prime Ministers  
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Note Figures are the mean prime minister ratings on zero to 10 scales. 
Source Combined Leaders’ stacked dataset. 
Canada shows a general decline in the ratings of the prime ministers from 
1968, with the exception of Brian Mulroney’s 1988 rating, and the most recent 
rating, that of Jean Chretien in 1997.  The overall decline in Canadian prime 
ministers’ ratings is just under two points on the zero to 10 scale over the 29 
year period.  Part of the explanation for the trend is that it begins at the start of 
the Trudeau period in 1968 and shows the slow decline in his popularity; 
another explanation is the unpopularity of three leaders: Joseph Clark in 1980, 
and Kim Campbell in 1993 who was barely more popular by that time than 
Brian Mulroney, the unpopular leader she replaced. 
In Australia the trend is much shorter—from 1987 to 2001—and therefore 
more difficult to interpret.  The period begins in the twilight years of the 
Hawke government; Hawke has been one of the most popular prime ministers 
of the postwar era, but by the late 1980s a series of economic difficulties had 
undermined his popularity which began to decline.  His successor, Paul 
Keating, was one of the most unpopular postwar prime ministers, but he was 
followed by John Howard, who maintained—and even increased—relatively 
high popularity ratings (McAllister, 2003).  The Australian trend is too short to 
provide any indication of general trends in the ratings of the prime ministers. 
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Figure 8: Party Leader Ratings in Australia 
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Note Figures are the mean leader ratings on zero to 10 scales. 
Source Combined Leaders’ stacked dataset. 
One possibility to explain these patterns, of course, is that the leader ratings 
are strongly related to partisanship, so that the results in Figure 7 are a 
consequence of the shifting support for parties.  This possibility is explored in 
detail in Figures 8, 9 and 10 which show leader ratings for the major parties in 
each of the three countries.  In Australia, the ratings for Labor leaders follow 
the general pattern shown earlier, with support for Bob Hawke and then Paul 
Keating in decline during the late 1980s and early 1990s, followed by an 
increase with the accession of Kim Beazley to the leadership.  However, the 
Liberal and National leaders (the two parties they represent have been in 
almost permanent coalition since 1923) show a consistent upward trend.  The 
Australian Democrats, a minor party formed in 1977 which has won election 
only to the upper house and with a high turnover of leaders, shows an 
inconsistent pattern. 
Figure 9: Party Leader Ratings in Britain 
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Note Figures are the mean leader ratings on zero to 10 scales. 
Source Combined Leaders’ stacked dataset. 
In Britain, Labour leaders have remained consistent in their ratings (Figure 
9), with the notable (and disastrous) exception of Michael Foot in the 1983 
general; Foot’s leftwing policies, particularly on unilateral nuclear 
disarmament, led the party to its worst electoral defeat since 1931.  As we noted 
earlier, Margaret Thatcher’s exceptional popularity following the Falklands 
War resulted in a dramatic peak in popularity for the Conservatives followed 
by a decline to 2001, when William Hague emerged as the most unpopular 
Conservative leader since Sir Alec Douglas-Hume in 1964.  The Canadian 
results (Figure 10) show the least variance attributable to party.  The most 
popular leader was, of course, Pierre Trudeau, who was prime minister from 
1968, when the trend data start.  His popularity, however, declined 
incrementally thereafter.  The Liberal Party’s fortunes also show an 
improvement in 1993, when Jean Chretien became prime minister. 
Figure 10: Party Leader Ratings in Canada 
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Note Figures are the mean leader ratings on a zero to 10 scales. 
Source Combined Leaders’ stacked dataset. 
6 Conclusion 
The role of the prime minister in Westminster systems has changed 
significantly over the past half century.  In the immediate postwar years the 
prime minister’s fate was inextricably bound up with that of his or her party; 
enduring voting patterns, the strength of the party system, and stable 
institutions of government all combined to ensure that the prime minister was 
the ‘first among equals’ and nothing more.  The first questioning of this 
traditional model of prime ministerial authority came with the widespread use 
of television in the 1960s and 1970s to cover elections and politics in general.  
Declining election participation and partisan dealignment have further 
suggested that a transition may be underway.  Institutional changes to the 
public service and the increasing complexity of modern decision-making have 
further served to concentrate power in the executive. 
More than half a century on, the debate is not whether the prime minister 
remains the ‘first among equals’, but whether he or she is now a president, with 
all of the executive power associated with that position.  The evidence 
presented here, rudimentary though it is in terms of the variables used, period 
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of coverage and limited number of countries, suggests a complex pattern.  The 
exogenous influences on the role of the prime minister, particularly the growth 
of television and the effective replacement of the party label by the leader’s 
name in the public’s mind, all suggest that there is a much enhanced role for 
the leader.  By contrast, the empirical evidence relating to the operation of 
responsible government and patterns of ministerial resignations, and voters’ 
ratings of the leaders themselves, suggest a highly variable pattern. 
This ambiguous conclusion indicates the difficulties in distinguishing 
between systemic changes in the Westminster systems and idiosyncratic 
changes due to the characteristics of a particular leader.  This is particularly 
acute when only three countries are being analyzed, and there are a limited 
range of elections.  Perhaps the answer is that systemic changes to the operation 
of parliamentary democracies based on the Westminster model do promote a 
centralization of power in the prime minister, but that the change is gradual 
and in some cases outweighed by the personalities involved.  For example, 
Margaret Thatcher was a strong prime minister with some presidential 
characteristics, while her successor, John Major, was more traditional in his 
approach to the role.  The personality of the leader is perhaps as important—or 
more important—than the duties and responsibilities of the position.  In short, 
the personality of the leader is greater than the strength of the trend. 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1 This change in the role of the Australian Senate came about in 1949, 
when the electoral system was changed from the alternative vote to 
proportional representation.  Since the early 1970s, the increasing 
propensity of governments to call double dissolution elections, in which 
the whole Senate in up for re-election, and the electoral threshold is 
correspondingly lower, has aided the election of minor parties and 
independents (Farrell, McAllister and Mackerras, 1995). 
2 The main exception was the Labour government between October 1974 
and 1979, when its majority disappeared.  In this case, strategic alliances 
were forged both with the Liberals and the Ulster Unionists, although 
the eventual outcome was the calling of a general election in 1979. 
3 Here, too, there are important caveats.  While most presidents are 
popularly elected, either through a direct election, as in Austria or 
Poland, some are indirectly elected through some form of electoral 
college, as in Argentina, Finland and the United States.  Some countries 
restrict the right of presidents to stand for re-election while the terms of 
office vary considerably; four or five year terms are the norm for most 
countries, but they range up to seven years in France and Ireland. 
4 In Australia, there were five ministerial resignations between 1945 and 
the end of the McMahon ministry in 1972, but 25 resignations between 
the start of the Whitlam ministry in 1972 and 2001.  In Britain, there were 
29 resignations between 1945 and the end of the first Wilson ministry in 
1970, and 42 resignations between the Heath ministry and the end of the 
Major ministry in 1997 (Dowding and Kang, 1998: 418).  Resignations are 
defined as those which involved some form of impropriety, rather than 
resignations upon retirement or as a result of ill-health. 
5 The empirical evidence that this increase is related to political leadership 
is limited.  In Australia and Britain, the correlation between the prime 
minister’s leader rating and the proportion of TV sets is 0.04 (statistically 
significant at p<.000) and 0.06 (p<.000), respectively, but in Canada the 
same figure is –0.11 (p<.000). 
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6  In defence of not having a formal debate, it is usually argued that 
scrutiny of party policies and the competence of the leaders is best left to 
professional media interviewers. 
7 The 1988 figure of 29 percent is the result of a change in the question 
wording, from ‘ Do you think of yourself as Liberal, Conservative, NDP, 
Reform, Bloc Quebecois or what? ‘ to ‘Do you think of yourself as 
Liberal, Conservative, NDP, Reform, Bloc Quebecois or none of these?’  
The substantial jump in nonpartisans in 1988 is therefore a 
methodological artifact (Blais et al, 2001). 
8 A third possible factor, though difficult to measure and highly variable 
across countries, is the role of the electoral system.  Electoral systems 
which permit voters to discriminate between candidates have more 
potential for leaders to influence the vote than, for example, party list 
systems. 
9  Two other factors, which King does not weigh as highly, are the legacy 
of history and whether the government is based in a single party or on 
multiple parties.  
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